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The mass collection and reuse of social data requires a reimagining of privacy and consent, with particular attention to the (in)equitable distribution of benefits and burdens between researchers and subjects. Instrumenting frontline clinical services to collect and steward data might mitigate the exploitation inherent to data collection---with attention to how subjects can meaningfully participate in stewardship. We explore participatory data stewardship in the context of clinical computer security for survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV). Via semi-structured interviews with IPV support workers, we explore how data are produced within the IPV care ecosystem at the Clinic to End Tech Abuse (CETA). We then conduct design provocations with clients of IPV services and their support workers, exploring possibilities for participatory data mechanisms like open records and dynamic consent. We find participation in data stewardship may benefit clients through improved agency, self-reflection, and control of self-narrative, and that incurred burdens may be alleviated by enlisting trusted stewards. We close with future work for CSCW interrogating how knowledge of digital-safety harms can and should be produced from clinical encounters, towards more equitable ways of knowing. 

Home health aides are paid professionals who provide long-term care to an expanding population of adults who need it. However, aides' work is often unrecognized by the broader caregiving team despite being in demand and crucial to care---an invisibility reinforced by ill-suited technological tools. In order to understand the invisible work aides perform and its relationship to technology design, we interviewed 13 aides employed by home care agencies in New York City. These aides shared examples that demonstrated the intertwined nature of both types of invisible work (i.e., emotions- and systems-based) and expanded the sociological mechanisms of invisibility (i.e., sociocultural, sociolegal, sociospatial) to include the sociotechnical. Through these findings, we investigate the opportunities, tensions, and challenges that could inform the design of tools created for these important, but often overlooked, frontline caregivers. 

The shutdown measures necessary to stop the spread of COVID-19 have amplified the role of technology in intimate partner violence (IPV). Survivors may be forced to endure lockdowns with their abusers, intensifying the dangers of technology-enabled abuse (e.g. stalking, harassment, monitoring, surveillance). They may also be forced to rely on potentially compromised devices to reach support networks: a dangerous dilemma for digital safety. This qualitative study examines how technologists with computer security expertise provided remote assistance to IPV survivors during the pandemic. Findings from 24 consults with survivors and five focus groups with technologist consultants show how remote delivery of technology support services raised three fundamental challenges: (1) ensuring safety for survivors and consultants; (2) assessing device security over a remote connection; and (3) navigating new burdens for consultants, including emotional labor. We highlight implications for HCI researchers creating systems that enable access to remote expert services for vulnerable people. 

A growing body of research suggests that intimate partner abusers use digital technologies to surveil their partners, including by installing spyware apps, compromising devices and online accounts, and employing social engineering tactics. However, to date, this form of privacy violation, called intimate partner surveillance (IPS), has primarily been studied from the perspective of victim-survivors. We present a qualitative study of how potential perpetrators of IPS harness the emotive power of sharing personal narratives to validate and legitimise their abusive behaviours. We analysed 556 stories of IPS posted on publicly accessible online forums dedicated to the discussion of sexual infidelity. We found that many users share narrative posts describing IPS as they boast about their actions, advise others on how to perform IPS without detection, and seek suggestions for next steps to take. We identify a set of common thematic story structures, justifications for abuse, and outcomes within the stories that provide a window into how these individuals believe their behaviour to be justified. Using these stories, we develop a four-stage framework that captures the change in a potential perpetrator's approach to IPS. We use our findings and framework to guide a discussion of efforts to combat abuse, including how we can identify crucial moments where interventions might be safely applied to prevent or deescalate IPS. 

Abusers increasingly use spyware apps, account compromise, and social engineering to surveil their intimate partners, causing substantial harms that can culminate in violence. This form of privacy violation, termed intimate partner surveillance (IPS), is a profoundly challenging problem to address due to the physical access and trust present in the relationship between the target and attacker. While previous research has examined IPS from the perspectives of survivors, we present the first measurement study of online forums in which (potential) attackers discuss IPS strategies and techniques. In domains such as cybercrime, child abuse, and human trafficking, studying the online behaviors of perpetrators has led to better threat intelligence and techniques to combat attacks. We aim to provide similar insights in the context of IPS. We identified five online forums containing discussion of monitoring cellphones and other means of surveilling an intimate partner, including three within the context of investigating relationship infidelity. We perform a mixed-methods analysis of these forums, surfacing the tools and tactics that attackers use to perform surveillance. Via qualitative analysis of forum content, we present a taxonomy of IPS strategies used and recommended by attackers, and synthesize lessons for technologists seeking to curb the spread of IPS.